The Birth of People's Republic of Antartica, стр. 20
Thus, a State was a utilitarian. A State desired only Good. A State, operating with the same dynamic as the lowest of its citizens, acted to increase its happiness, its pleasure. A State should be assessed in terms of the effectiveness of its utilitarian conduct, as to whether its conduct was appropriate in terms of the Good produced in comparison to other possible actions. It was therefore meaningless to speak of a State as moral or immoral, as legal or illegal, as decent or indecent, as virtuous or vice-ridden, as human or inhuman, as godly or blasphemous.
This all seemed removed from me at first reading. As with traditional utilitarianism, everything about New Benthamism is in the example. So it was not until Charity Bentham discussed the United States of America’s conduct with regard to the Vietnam war, 1955-1975, that I realized the weighty and, yes, sinister significance of Brave New Benthamism.
Following the French Republic’s (Paris) abandonment of its Indochina colonies in 1954, the United States of America (Washington) was confronted with three choices in Southeast Asia. Washington could have supported the Republic of South Vietnam (Saigon), for two units of pleasure, Washington’s and Saigon’s, while at the same time opposing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Hanoi), for one unit of pain, Hanoi’s: a balance of positive 1. Or, Washington could have remained neutral toward Saigon and Hanoi, for no pleasure or pain: a balance of zero. Or, Washington could have supported Saigon and Hanoi, for three units of pleasure, though this would have led to such severe contradictions for Saigon and Hanoi that there would also have resulted two units of pain: a balance of positive 1.
With this model, Washington’s historical decision supporting Saigon and opposing Hanoi was viable. Though it did not produce the greatest Good, there was no greater Good.
Once Hanoi revealed its desire to destroy Saigon, Washington’s support for Saigon, positive 2, was offset by Washington’s military opposition to Hanoi (war), negative 2: a balance of zero. There was no Good to be gained by remaining committed, in Vietnam. According to Charity Bentham, Washington’s historical decision to remain supportive of Saigon and belligerent toward Hanoi was neither immoral, illegal, indecent, sinful, inhuman, nor blasphemous. It lacked utility.
Washington’s decision to remain in Vietnam was explained by American leaders as Good because, they asserted, to withdraw as Paris had would permit not only the triumph of Hanoi, one unit of pleasure, but also the destruction of Saigon, one unit of pain, the probable destruction of the Khmer Republic (Phnom Penh) and the Kingdom of Laos (Vientiane), two more units of pain, and the weakening of Washington’s armed forces, another unit of pain: a balance of at least negative 3. As American leaders, for two decades, exhorted, Washington’s decision to remain in Vietnam achieved the greatest Good.
In time, as it appeared that Saigon, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, and the deployed American armed forces could not resist Hanoi without excessive support by Washington, the utility of the international relationships had to be recalculated. This was a gradual, contradictory process, Charity Bentham conceded, involving the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Moscow) and the People’s Republic of China (Peking) and many others. It would be fair to sum up, argued Charity Bentham, that Washington was eventually placed in such a position wherein its support of Saigon and belligerence toward Hanoi resulted in several units of pain. To remain in Vietnam was bad. To withdraw from Vietnam was bad. The wise statesman could see that to withdraw as Paris had was less bad than staying, or more Good. The principle of utility indicated that Washington should abandon Saigon, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, and its armed forces, four units of pain, that Washington should make peace with Hanoi, two units of pleasure, and that Washington should seek other ways to offset further the pain of the situation. In utilitarianism this often means that one should enlarge one’s model.
That Washington historically did this, by rapprochement with Moscow, two units of pleasure, by entreating Peking, two units of pleasure, was strong evidence, wrote Charity Bentham, that New Benthamism dominated modern diplomacy, that it was the modern political ethic.
To those who would cry out that war is outrage; that Washington’s conduct in Vietnam was a disgrace; that Saigon was a corrupt tyranny that ruled by torture; that Hanoi was the spiritual leader of Vietnam, though it too ruled by torture; that the American leaders who persisted in supporting Saigon despite a popular uprising among draft-age Americans had to do so by trampling on reason and imposing a legislative dictatorship, thereby violating human, natural, and especially civil rights, thereby alienating the citizenry from its own elected officialdom to the point where the democratic process was dismantled and only chance exposure of Nixon’s misdeeds saved the Republic; and more; Charity Bentham replied: stuff and nonsense.
Utilitarianism denied such concepts as social contracts, natural rights, human rights, civil rights, inalienable rights. These ideas depended upon deontological systems—ones that claim that theft, torture, murder, and war are always wrong—and are therefore subject to the contradictions—the stuff and nonsense—of habit, prejudice, custom, ritual, instinct, and feelings. Social contracts are said to be legal fictions. Inalienable rights are a logical contradiction. And civil rights must remain continually amendable in order to comply with the ongoing pursuit of the Good—they are never inviolate.
At this point in my study, it was apparent to me that New Benthamism was what Peregrine and Israel would call “the bad guys.” New Benthamism had made a dispassionate system of everything that Father and his friends had fought against and been crushed by. It was