Payton and Brees, стр. 33
From film study and having played the Vikings four months earlier in the regular season opener, Payton could see how quickly Smith, Barr, and Kendricks diagnosed plays, sometimes ambushing the opposing ballcarrier in the backfield just after the handoff.
Payton knew Zimmer implicitly trusted his veteran defensive leaders at key moments in the game and often aligned in a certain single-high safety zone defense during tight red-zone situations. Payton wanted to use that aggressiveness against the Vikings. To do that, he needed to create an illusion. So, using the Turbin run in 2016 as a guideline, the Saints designed a play late Thursday night, less than 72 hours before kickoff, that would exploit the Vikings’ aggressive tactics.
The play was called Full Left Twin Y Orbit Q8 Kill Toss 39 Michael and it provided Brees two options at the line of scrimmage. If the Vikings blitzed, he would check to a quick pass to Mike Thomas, one of the Saints’ favorite blitz-beaters. But if Zimmer did what he usually does and the defense aligned the way the Saints expected, in an aggressive zone look with man-to-man principles, then Brees would call their special pass play.
The key to the play was the window dressing. The Saints had to make it look exactly like the one the Colts ran against the Vikings a year earlier. And if the subterfuge worked, it would fool the Vikings’ best defenders and attack two of their most vulnerable ones.
Strong safety Anthony Harris was a former undrafted rookie from Virginia who was primarily a reserve and special teams standout during his first three seasons with the Vikings. He has since developed into a Pro Bowl–caliber player, but at the time, he was only playing because starter Andrew Sendejo had left the game after being concussed during a collision with Michael Thomas in pass coverage. The Saints knew the inexperienced Harris might be overly aggressive from his position in the back center of the Vikings defense and were going to challenge him.
The other key target was slot cornerback Terence Newman, a Zimmer favorite, who, at 39, was the oldest defensive back in the league. The Saints loved the matchup of the physically gifted 24-year-old Thomas in the slot against the aging, slow-footed Newman. Payton was so confident in the matchup he told Thomas earlier in the week, “You’re going to retire Terence Newman on this play.”
The Saints broke the huddle and wide receiver Willie Snead aligned to the left side with fellow receivers Ted Ginn Jr. and Michael Thomas to the right. When Brees saw the Vikings defense align in the exact defensive look they wanted, he immediately checked into the pass option of the play by audibling at the line of scrimmage.
To the average onlooker, Brees’ hand signals and audibles meant nothing. To the Saints offensive players, it was Go Time. Toss 39 Michael was on.
Brees quickly signaled for Kamara to move from a right off-set position in the backfield to the “I” spot directly behind him, then signaled for Hill to start his waggle motion from his alignment on the left side of the formation.
“We were giving the illusion that we were running a toss crack play to the left, and so what we did is we had Josh Hill do this little back-and-forth motion to make it look like, ‘Oh, here I come to crack the [defensive] end,’” Brees said. “With smart, instinctive linebackers and safeties, the minute that they see and feel that motion, they’re running to where they feel like you’re going to toss crack because they know that if they can beat their block, then they’re going to hit this thing in the backfield for a loss. So honestly, it’s a play that you run against smart defenses. And that’s a smart defense.”
The Saints probably wouldn’t have tried this tactic against an inexperienced defense. But against a savvy, veteran-laden unit like the Vikings, it was perfect.
“You’re counting on them to do what you have studied [on tape],” Payton said. “It’s hard to fool the dummy who’s gotten fooled a bunch. He’s inconsistent. You’re looking for consistent behavior, and these guys [the Vikings] are smart, now.”
To sell the ruse, Payton instructed Hill to shuffle his feet extra times and stare down the end, the exact opposite of his normal M.O. Hill’s acting job worked like a charm. As he began his waggle motion, Smith, Barr, and Kendricks, on cue, immediately started to cheat that way.
“Josh sold the crack so much you can see Harrison Smith basically jump into blitz mode to get into the backfield,” Payton said. “To him, this was kindergarten.”
Except it wasn’t.
After the snap, Brees enhanced the illusion by faking a pitch to Kamara, who broke to his left as if running a toss sweep. The play-fake caused safety Harris, aligned in the back center of the end zone, to take two quick steps toward Kamara, leaving a massive window on the backside of the Vikings defense where Thomas and Ginn were breaking into their pass routes from the right side of the formation.
Just as Payton expected, Newman was no match for the powerful Thomas, who easily beat the veteran cornerback on a quick slant. Brees’ strike led him perfectly into the void vacated by Harris. Thomas scored standing up. No Vikings defender was within four yards of him in the end zone.
“That’s as good as it gets,” Payton said. “When it all comes together like that, it’s like fuckin’ Christmas.”
Walk-in touchdowns in the red zone are rare commodities in the NFL, where the schemes are so sophisticated and the athletes so fast and well-prepared. When they occur, you know something unusual happened, either a busted coverage or a well-designed scheme.
“The pro report [from director of pro personnel Terry Fontenot],”